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This paper examines the changes that took place in the image of the Ottoman Turks
in Hungary during the 19th century. Though the Ottoman attacks in the 15th and 16th
centuries destroyed the medieval Kingdom of Hungary and the following 150 years
of the Ottoman rule in Hungary had considerable negative consequences, by the end
of the 19th century negative sentiments regarding the Turks shifted, and during the
Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 there were enthusiastic pro-Turkish demonstra-
tions in Budapest. The paper analyses the causes of this turn in Hungarian historical
thinking and demonstrates, e.g. through the themes of the most popular historical
paintings of the 19th century, that more recent anti-Habsburg and anti-Russian senti-
ments among the Hungarians led to active support for the Turks, if only in a peaceful
way, since the foreign policy of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy remained neutral.
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The 150-year-long Ottoman rule over Hungary’s territory had very negative ef-
fects, demographically, economically and politically. While before the 16th cen-
tury the Kingdom of Hungary had been a Central European great power, in mod-
ern history the country played only a peripheral role as part of the Habsburg Mon-
archy. There were – and still are – numerous Hungarian historians who consider
the Ottoman occupation to have been the biggest catastrophe in the history of the
nation, and according to them this militaristic empire should be held responsible
for almost all the misfortunes of later Hungarian fate.1
Though modern Hungarian historiography regards these historical processes
as more complex,2 it is obvious that there were no other empires and countries in
Hungarian history that were inimical to the Hungarian state of nation for a longer
period of time than the Ottomans. King Louis the Great was the first Hungarian
king who fought against the Turks in the middle of the 14th century, and Austria,
with considerable numbers of Hungarian soldiers in the imperial army, led the last
war against the Ottoman Empire as late as the period between 1788 and 1791.
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But not only is the length (more than 350 years!) of these hostile confrontation
of the two (Hungary and the Ottoman Empire) important, the battle at Mohács in
1526 also acquired symbolic significance. It brought the powerful and prestigious
medieval Kingdom of Hungary to an end. Hungarian tradition associates the fall
of the medieval kingdom with the single battle at Mohács. All the humiliation,
suffering, and loss of life and livelihoods that preceded and followed it, in the
150-year era of Ottoman rule, have been compressed into this one word: Mohács.3
This battle is seen as having been the most tragic event of Hungarian history, and
the Turks have often been referred to as the scourage of God, who wanted to pun-
ish the Hungarian nation for their sins. (In the 16th and 17th centuries the Catholics
and the Protestants blamed each other. A well-known Lutheran preacher, István
Magyari, wrote in 1602 that the Turks were our enemies well before Luther was
born, so the Protestants cannot be to blame for this blow of divine justice.4 His
great disputant, the later Archbishop and Cardinal Péter Pázmány, stated that
Hungary was victorious over the Turks during the Catholic centuries, and the ca-
tastrophe of 1526 happened only after Protestant thought had found its place in the
country.5)
Modern historians do not think, however, that some historical events or even
the most radical changes could be explained only by transcendental factors, so it is
more important to realize that the tragic Mohács battle was seen as a great national
catastrophe by both sides. And there is no question that all major political groups
during the so-called Ottoman age wanted to expel the Turks. Even the political
elite of the Principality of Transylvania felt that their vassal position was only a
forced situation due to the power relations, and not a rationally or emotionally
sought-after alliance. So it is not surprising that the Turks became symbols of the
evil foreigners, the hated pagans, who were often depicted in terrible caricatures
in propaganda texts written with the hope of obtaining help from the Christian
West. And Mohács became a symbol for national mourning as later generations
looked back on (or portrayed in cultural and historical artefacts) the battle with
sorrow and regret.
However, at the dawn of the era of modern Hungarian nationalism, the sym-
bolic meaning of the tragic Mohács battle slowly began to change. There were
several poems, dramatic plays, articles, and pamphlets that had one main goal: to
make the apparently sleeping nation, which was blamed for the not particularly
glorious condition of the country, awake. For these romantic generations, history
provided examples to follow or to avoid. The medieval significance of Hungary
during the Árpád or Anjou dynasty’s rule made these romantic nationalists very
proud of their historic origins and their national roots, and they were embarrassed
because they felt they had lost this power. The medieval kings, great military lead-
ers who defeated their enemies, were praised as national heroes, and their virtues
were presented as exemplary legends for the contemporary youth. From this point
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of view, the lost battle at Mohács was a turning point, as Mihály Vörösmarty, a fa-
mous poet of later decades, wrote in one of his earliest poems: “Mohács, cemetery
of glory, my name is the curse of the Hungarians.” The Catholic bishop of the
nearby city of Pécs ordered to build a small chapel at the battlefield in 1813, and
since 1817 the priests of the diocese have organized memorial holy masses on Au-
gust 29, the anniversary of the battle. One of the priests, János Kövér, said in his
sermon in 1837: “The Mohács tragedy hurts to every real Hungarian, and, in par-
ticular, when he thinks about those golden ages, when our glorious fatherland
stood with its one leg upon the Black sea, with the other upon the Tyrrhenian,
blood flows from his heart…” In 1842 the noble estates of Baranya county sug-
gested building a national monument to the very place where king Louis II died in
the battle in order to draw the attention of later generations to heroes of the past.
They were seen not only as victims, but also as heroes who sacrificed themselves,
who died for the fatherland. This self-sacrifice and heroism was presented as an
example to follow, and the tragic meaning of the historical event became an in-
spiring recollection of the national past. József Eötvös, one of the finest political
thinkers of his day – and a less talented poet – wrote in his poem Mohács in 1847:
“The faithful bosom, who lived for the fatherland / fertilizes its soil as he returns to
ash / and his spirit remains by the grave / urging descendants to act.”6
So, the optimism of the so-called Reform Era (the 1830s and 1840s, when the
Hungarian political and cultural elite made tremendous efforts to revitalize the
country by pushing through political and social reforms in order to create a system
that resembled the developed West European countries) changed the symbolism
of Mohács, too. The “awakeners” used this poetic picture for their own purposes,
claiming that even after such a terrible catastrophe there a better period in history
could come if their contemporaries were worthy successors of their heroic ances-
tors.
Though the symbolic meaning of the Mohács battle and the whole Ottoman pe-
riod changed a great deal in the Romantic era, the fights with the Turks remained
the most popular historic age, apart from the medieval Hungarian great power.
The themes of the most celebrated historical paintings of this period offer evi-
dence of this. Romantic nationalism was very keen on presenting the dramatic
events of the past, so these genres of paintings enjoyed considerable popularity in
the 19th century. There were paintings with themes related to the Ottoman period
among the earliest paintings: the monumental canvas of Peter Krafft from 1825,
showing the last storm of Miklós Zrínyi at Szigetvár 1566, and another painting of
rather low quality by an artist from Vienna depicting a Hungarian warrior, Mihály
Dobozi, whose wife asked him to kill her rather than allow her to fall into the
hands of the Turks.7 These historic paintings portrayed the martyrdom of Hungar-
ian men and women as patterns to be followed, if perhaps in a more modern and
less bloody way. Other later works of art portrayed the most popular family of the
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medieval Hungarian Kingdom: the Hunyadi family. János Hunyadi, the governor,
who defeated the Ottomans in numerous battles, first at the victorious siege of
Nándorfehárvár/Belgrade in 1456, and his son, the great Hungarian king,
Matthias (1458–1490), for whom the Hungarian noble diet (the parliament of the
estates) wanted to set up a national monument in the 1840s, though they were un-
able to collect enough money.8 So a more glorious past had become popular by
that time, adapting to the more optimistic national sentiments.
The Turks were represented in these paintings always as hostis naturalis, he-
reditary enemies of Hungary. The greatest national heroes were those who had
been able to defeat the Turks and the greatest national martyrs were those who
perished at their hands. Thus the Turks, perhaps not surprisingly, were the peren-
nial enemies for Hungarian national consciousness in the first half of the 19th cen-
tury, as the devastating wars against the Turks could be cast as the historic age that
had had the greatest and most overwhelmingly negative impact on the face of the
country and nation.
Some decades later, however, during the 1876–78 wars in the Balkan Penin-
sula, Hungarian public opinion was mostly in support of the Turks. There were
several demonstrations for the Ottoman Empire, students and the main opposition
parties (not just the radical democratic parties of the so-called Independence
Party, but the conservatives, too) demanded a pro-Turkish foreign policy.9 The
university students decided to present a fancy sword to General Abdel Karem,
who defeated the Serbs in a couple of battles in 1876. They travelled to Constanti-
nople and on January 13, 1877 they gave their gift to Abdel Karem Pasha. They
were received by the Minister of War Affairs, as well.10 Some months later, in
April 1877, the Sultan, Abdül-Hamid II sent back three dozen illuminated manu-
scripts, which had been kept in his treasury since his ancestor, Suleiman the Great,
captured Buda. These manuscripts, some of them from the old library of King
Matthias, were seen as signs of the friendship between the two nations. This Turk-
ish delegation had traveled to Vienna, because they were not allowed to visit Bu-
dapest directly, as the Austrian foreign ministry wanted to avoid any kind of com-
plications with the powers at war. So they left the books there, and three days later
a small group of librarians brought them from Vienna to the Budapest University
Library quietly, without any great celebration.11
But some days later another Turkish delegation arrived in Hungary. Though
this was a non-official visit, they were received enthusiastically. Their train
stopped at all major railway stations, and distinguished committees, headed
mostly by the mayors and other celebrities, greeted them on behalf of the given
towns. On April 29, 1877 the Turkish delegation was received by a huge Budapest
crowd of 20,000 or 30,000. The speakers praised the Turkish nation and the Sul-
tan, and expressed their hopes that after such long wars in the past, the Turkish and
Hungarian nations would be friends forever, as they were brother nations.12
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This visit of 15 men from the Ottoman Empire took place when the Russians
declared war on the Ottoman Empire. At the beginning of the war the Turkish
troops were able to defend themselves, first and foremost at the fortress of Plevna,
where several thousand Russians died while attacking the Turkish trenches. The
Hungarians were delighted, the defender of Plevna, Osman Nuri Pasha was cele-
brated as a hero, and the Hungarian newspapers – pro-government and opposition
newspapers alike – all wished for the victory of the Ottoman Empire.13
Moreover, there was a smaller group of Hungarian patriots in Transylvania,
who wanted to do more than just pray for the victory of the Turks. During the sum-
mer of 1877 some noblemen in the eastern region of Transylvania, the Magyar
Székelyföld, decided to organize a smaller army to attack the Russians. They
knew of course that a few thousand Hungarians would not be able to do consider-
able harms to the colossal army of the Tsar. They planned only a sabotage action
in the hinterland of the Russians, namely, with several thousand brave volunteers
they wanted to move forward to the Sereth River and blow up the bridge over it.
They hoped to hinder the supply of the Russian troops fighting in the territory of
contemporary Bulgaria, so they could be defeated by the Turks.14
Though this so-called Székely coup was denounced in September 1877, and
the leaders Gábor Ugron and Miklós Bartha, young members of the radical oppo-
sition, had to flee, no one was punished and the king (following the advice of the
government) decided to end the legal proceedings. This story demonstrates the
general sympathy towards the conspirators. When the conspiracy was revealed,
the leaders had to hide from the gendarmerie, but Miklós Bartha happened to meet
Gábor Bethlen, one of the Transylvanian lord-lieutenants (leader of a county, ap-
pointed by the government) who asked him: “Where are you going?” “To
Nagyszeben”, was the answer, a nearby bigger city in Transylvania. “Not
enough”, confided the government official, instead of arresting him, so Bartha
traveled to take refuge among relatives in the far northern part of the country.15
After bloody fights, Plevna was captured and the Russians were able to pass
through the Balkan Mountains and by March 1878 they were only a few miles
from Constantinople. Hungary was concerned, students and workers protested
against the neutrality of the Habsburg Empire, and the crowd attacked even the
palace of the prime minister.
All who are familiar with the history of 19th century Europe know what hap-
pened next. Alarmed by the extension of Russian power into the Balkans, the
Great Powers forced modifications of the treaty at the Congress of Berlin. The
main change here was that Bulgaria would be split, according to earlier agree-
ments among the Great Powers that precluded the creation of a large new Slavic
state, and so Russian dominance over the Balkans was over. The great powers
wanted to prevent the Balkans from falling under the influence of their rival, Rus-
sia. But how should one understand the enthusiastic demonstrations in Hungary
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for their hereditary enemy? Why had the Hungarians forgotten the bloody wars
against the Turks? Why did they think that the Turks were their friends or even
their brothers?
It is rather difficult to understand how the Hungarian national sentiments to-
wards the Turks could change so dramatically in the space of only a few decades.
These decades were, however, full of highly important historical events. The
so-called Reform Era concluded with the lawful revolution of 1848, when the
Habsburg kings let Hungary turn into a parliamentary monarchy and the April
laws guaranteed the autonomy of Hungary within the Habsburg Monarchy. 1848
can be called the rebirth of the Hungarian nation, and Kossuth, Deák, Batthyány,
Eötvös, Széchenyi and their compatriots established the modern Hungarian state.
But this independent modern Hungary did not enjoy freedom for long. The Habs-
burg dynasty wanted to get back the rights the April laws had given to Hungary.
By the end of 1848, Hungary, led by Lajos Kossuth, found itself forced to fight for
its liberty against not only the rioting ethnic groups (first and foremost Serbs,
Romanians and Croats), but the Austrian imperial army too. After sustaining bit-
ter defeats, the Hungarian military force was able to start a counter-attack in the
spring of 1849, and during the glorious spring campaign, the Hungarians defeated
the Austrian imperial army in many battles, so the new emperor, the young Fran-
cis Joseph, had to ask for military aid from the most absolutistic monarch in Eu-
rope, Tsar Nicholas I. The Russians sent a huge army to fight against the Hungari-
ans (200,000 men, the biggest army in Europe since the Napoleonic wars!), so
there was no question about the defeat of Hungary.16
Kossuth and some other Hungarian leaders fled to Turkey and the Sultan,
backed by Britain and the USA, refused to deliver up the Hungarian emigrants to
the victorious Austrians, and in doing so saved their lives. Though Kossuth had no
chance to return to Hungary, 18 years later Francis Joseph and the Hungarians ne-
gotiated the Compromise of 1867, which gave somewhat smaller autonomy to the
country within the Habsburg Monarchy. Austria turned into a double state offi-
cially called the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and while the Hungarians enjoyed
total autonomy in internal affairs, they had practically a veto right in the foreign
affairs of the Habsburg Empire.
Some of the important changes that took place during the three decades before
1876 had a very important impact on the way Hungarians began to think about
their neighbor to the south, the Ottoman Empire.
First of all, I would like to underline that the 1848–49 war of independence was
the most decisive experience in the formation of the modern Hungarian nation.
Though this struggle ended with a military defeat, the Hungarian patriots could be
proud of their achievement, because the joint forces of two European great powers
were needed to defeat them. And this heroic and partially victorious struggle
brought together the heterogeneous parts of the Hungarian society: the noble mid-
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dle class and the former serfs, who had just been liberated due to the April laws,
fought together for Hungarian freedom and independence, as they must have felt
that they were defending the new and free modern Hungarian state and their own
personal freedom. If 1848–49 can be called the decisive experience in forging the
modern Hungarian nation, then Lajos Kossuth was the leader of this romantic and
uniting struggle. From that point on, Hungarians could not be indifferent to his
personal fate. He was called “our father, Kossuth” by the peasants, as they thought
of him as the person who had liberated them.17
The huge significance of Kossuth in the souls of the Hungarians is one of the
things that helps one understand why sentiments towards Turkey changed so dra-
matically. The peasants, who might have been taught about the old wars against
the Ottoman Empire in the primary schools, had a direct and personal experience
of 1848–49. They might have admired the heroism of Zrínyi, Dobó and other his-
torical figures from the 16th or 17th centuries, but Kossuth was a living national
hero for them. (The former governor of Hungary died in 1894 in his exile in Italy.)
And the Turks might have been blamed because of their attacks on Hungary in by-
gone centuries, but the conflicts had taken place so long ago, whereas the willing-
ness of the Ottomans to provide an asylum for Kossuth and other Hungarian refu-
gees was part of the present. Something said by an old man after listening to the
long speeches of the Turkish delegation in Budapest in April 1877, which he,
of course, could not understand, offers a good illustration of how people may
well have reacted: “Though we do not make sense of it, it is enough to know that
they received our compatriots wholeheartedly.”18 And if we can trust the articles
of a young journalist named Kálmán Mikszáth, written some months later, in Au-
gust 1877, some participants in the demonstrations in Budapest who were cele-
brating the victorious Osman Pasha cheered for Kossuth, who actually had not
done anything at the time, but he played an important role in popularizing the
Turks, so it was not a mere coincidence that he was mentioned together with
Abdül-Hamid II.19
But if we want to understand the sudden sympathy felt for the Turks, we have
to consider some other factors as well. We could mention some more historic
paintings just after the defeated Revolution of 1848, which show struggles from
the Turkish age again. But the meaning of these works of art had been modified.
The heroes of the anti-Turkish struggles could be understood during the 1850s
as personifications of the later Hungarian efforts to defend the country’s inde-
pendence, as well. Of course, the Habsburg censor did not allow people to praise
the 1848–49 heroes openly, but a historic painting with a double-meaning could
not be banned, as it depicted only some ancient fights against the Turks. So the im-
ages of Turks in these paintings did not refer to real Turks. Rather they were sym-
bols of the perennial enemies of Hungary in general, which at the time meant the
Austrians.
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On the other hand, a new topic emerged among these historic paintings,
namely, the events of the so-called “kuruc” – “labanc” struggles. These pictures
had more sensitive meanings, as the labanc party was the loyal pro-Habsburg op-
tion, while the kuruc figures in the paintings recalled the anti-Habsburg warriors
of 1848–49.20 We can add some pictures to this group that portrayed the 15th cen-
tury Hunyadi family, but not the traditional figures, the brave and mostly success-
ful warrior János Hunyadi or King Matthias, but László Hunyadi, the elder
brother of Matthias, who was executed by King László V, who apparently be-
longed to the Habsburg dynasty.21 The painting, which depicts the immense pain
of the executed László Hunyadi’s mother and bride, reminded the spectators of
the perfidy of Francis Joseph, who ordered the execution of leaders of 1848–49.
After the Compromise of 1867, this veiled anti-Habsburg orientation lost its pop-
ularity, as the majority of Hungarians accepted the new political situation. The lib-
eral institutions of the new political system gave more freedom for the expression
of anti-Habsburg sentiments as well, so the political minority, the so-called oppo-
sition of 1848, was allowed to give expression to their anti-Habsburg feelings, but
it was not as widespread and general as it had been in the 1850s.
As one can observe, by the mid-1870s the former assessment of the Turks had
undergone a shift. Moreover, the contemporary Ottoman Empire was seen as a
weak state, a dying old empire, often called “the sick man of Europe”, which, of
course, could not be hated anymore, as it was more pitiful than terrifying. Modern
nationalism created a new enemy: the Russians, who were not only responsible
for the tragic defeat of the Hungarian war of independence, but remained an auto-
cratic, despotic great power, an archenemy of all European liberals in the 19th cen-
tury. The Hungarian war of independence was defeated by the Habsburgs and the
Romanovs together, but after the 1867 Compromise the bitter hatred against the
Austrians eased. (Actually, the reign of Francis Joseph became legal as he became
the crowned king of the country.) So there remained one real enemy: Russia.
Moreover, the colossal Russian empire was feared because of Pan-Slavic tenden-
cies too: some influential St. Petersburg circles were blamed for having allegedly
inciting the Slavic ethnic minorities in the Habsburg Monarchy.
So the Turks were celebrated in 1876–78, not only because of their past posi-
tive role, the help they had given Hungarian refugees in 1849, but because of their
present struggle against the Russians, the same autocratic empire that had helped
Francis Joseph defeat the Hungarian war of liberty. Following very simple logic,
“the enemy of my enemy is my friend”, the Ottoman Empire’s successful fight
against Tsarist Russia could have been seen as revenge for 1849. This anti-Rus-
sian sentiment was so general that Balázs Orbán, the third main organizer of the
Székely coup, agitated among the Székely peasants by saying the following: “We
are going to pay back these Russian dogs for 1848 and 1849!”22 And the meetings
after the fall of Plevna in December 1877 all over the country demanded almost in
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unison, to quote Mikszáth again: “Lead us against the Russians! … We wish to go
to war.”23 So the hatred against the Russians was greater than the love for the
Turks, who enjoyed popularity among the Hungarians only for a short time.
The Hungarians loved the Turks because of radical national sentiments. The
Turks were fighting against the Russians, defeating the symbols of tyranny, and
taking vengeance against the oppressors of the Hungarian fight for independence
of 1848–1849. Had the Turks gone to war against any other nation than the Rus-
sians, the Hungarians would not have been so enthusiastic about them. The Turks
only played a role that theoretically could have been played by other nations as
well, and in this case, the Hungarians would have cheered for them as they did for
the Turks at the time.
However, these friendly sentiments for the Ottoman Empire made it possible
for the Turks to lose their image as an enemy forever. They might have been con-
sidered the hereditary enemies of the Hungarian nation earlier, but since Hungary
had in the meantime found other enemies, the negative consequences of the Otto-
man wars were put a bit to the side.
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